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ABSTRACT: This paper offers a new interpretation of Aristotle’s logical system 
that allows us to break away from a presumably inescapable dilemma inherent 
to any attempt of justifi cation from a strictly formal standpoint; namely, 
either the system stands apart from any standard system of mathematical 
logic — propositional logic, class theory, quantifi cation theory, etc. — or it is 
lacking in consistency. While some other attempts have been made that seem 
to avoid this dilemma, they have always resulted in an intolerably strong 
restriction of the Semantics underpinning the Aristotelian system. These are, 
therefore, unsatisfactory solutions that undermine some of the key principles 
of Aristotelian metaphysics. One by-product of the solution presented here 
is a reappraisal of some elements in Aristotle’s theory of Being that breaks 
down several contemporary misconceptions on the subject. 
Key words: logic, Aristotle, justifi cation, mathematical logic. 
Resumo: Este artigo oferece uma nova interpretação do sistema lógico de 
Aristóteles que nos permite tomar distância de um dilema supostamente sem 
escapatória inerente a qualquer tentativa de justifi cação desde um ponto de 
partida estritamente formal; mais especifi camente, ou o sistema se identifi ca 
com algum sistema lógico-matemático – lógica proposicional, teoria de classes, 
teoria da quantifi cação, etc. – ou é considerado inconsistente. Embora tenham 
sido feitas outras tentativas que parecem evitar este dilema, sempre resultaram 
numa restrição intoleravelmente forte à Semântica que dá sustentação ao 
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sistema aristotélico. Estas são, consequentemente, soluções insatisfatórias que 
minam alguns princípios chaves da metafísica aristotélica. Uma das soluções 
propostas aqui é uma revalorização de alguns elementos da teoria aristotélica 
do Ser que derruba alguns mal-entendidos contemporâneos sobre o tema. 
Palavras-chave: lógica, Aristóteles, justifi cação, lógica matemática.
Introduction: Have we to lose the 
philosophical soul in order to conquer 
the world of formalism?
When the modern development of Logic, as from Boole onwards, made 
evident the insuffi ciently formal nature of classical Logic in general and of Aristotelian 
Logic in particular, an iconoclastic, lasting obsession took over the scholars in this 
fi eld (at least until after the Second World War). An attitude became commonplace 
amongst logicians that could be considered as the opposite of the Hippocratic oath 
among doctors; namely, a profession of anti-Aristotelian faith as a guarantee of 
scientifi c respectability for any logical research worthy of this name.
It was not until the publication of Jan Łukasiewicz’s pioneering work (1951-
1957) that such global disqualifi cation started to be seen as an exaggeration.3 
Aristotelian Logic, having lost its aura of a universally valid system, gradually left 
also its undeserved place at the bottom of the scientifi c value scale and started to 
be regarded as a specifi c case (or as one of limited validity) within the whole set of 
possible logical systems (more precisely, as an application of a given formal system).
Once this is conceded, a closely related question arises: If Aristotelian Logic is, 
in fact, an application of a formal system, what particular formal system? Łukasiewicz, 
referring to its most important formal core, Syllogistic (Analytics in Aristotle’s words), 
thinks it is a peculiar (implicit) application of propositional Logic in which syllogisms 
work as true material implications whose antecedent is made up of the conjunction 
of the premises and whose consequent is made up of the conclusion.4
Łukasiewicz’s interpretation, followed by Bocheński (1956-1962) and, with 
several nuances, by Patzig (1969), was questioned by important scholars such as 
Kneale and Kneale (1962) and Prior (1962). It has also been refuted (incontestably, 
in my view) on several key points by Rose (1968), Sainati (1968), Granger (1970), 
Smiley (1973) and Corcoran (1974a), among others.
Łukasiewicz’s approach is no doubt a bona fi de move. Russell (1956), Strawson 
(1971) and Quine (1982) apparently proved, on grounds we will later look into, the 
impossibility of interpreting the propositions — and consequently the deductions 
(syllogisms) — of Aristotelian Logic in the formal language of fi rst order predicate 
Logic and even in the language of the Logic of classes. Therefore, assuming that the 
underlying Logic of the Aristotelian system is propositional Logic, or truth-functional 
calculus (a fact of which Aristotle was presumably not aware; although, always according 
3 Actually, Łukasiewicz also criticizes Aristotelian Logic from the standpoint of Modern Logic. He saves, 
though, its essential core and at the same time distinguishes it from the so-called traditional Logic (mostly 
Scholastic) that, in his opinion, was nothing but a hybrid between properly Aristotelian elements and the 
Stoic propositional Logic.
4 The material implication (or the ‘conditional’, in Quine’s terminology) is valid, too, whenever both the 
antecedent and the consequent are false. This eventuality is irrelevant for Aristotle, whose aim was to provide 
science with an infallible deductive method capable of giving shape to the demonstration of true propositions.
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to Łukasiewicz, he designed some elements of his theory as if he was familiar with 
some of the principles of such Logic), the Polish author suggests that the Aristotelian 
system should be accepted as a special logical language whose variables represent 
universal terms (in the Aristotelian traditional sense) and whose logical functors are 
the four connectors traditionally symbolized with the letters A (universal affi rmative), 
E (universal negative), I (particular affi rmative) and O (particular negative). In the face of 
criticisms from the majority of modern logicians who consider invalid some of the 
relations established by Aristotle between propositions in virtue of these four functors,5 
Łukasiewicz accepts those relations by way of previous defi nitions upon which he builds 
his own interpretative scheme in terms, as mentioned above, of propositional Logic (thus 
superimposing the functors of propositional calculus on the Aristotelian functors).6 The 
cost he bears, or makes Aristotle bear, for this redemption of his logical system (at least 
as far as Syllogistic is concerned) is simply giving up any attempt of coherent logical 
analysis of the propositions which constitute syllogisms. This price is doubtless too high, 
for Aristotle does indeed base his theory of reasoning (or Syllogistic) upon a theory of 
simple propositions which has, furthermore, profound philosophical implications.7 But 
let us see why Łukasiewicz thinks he must proceed as he does.
Universal versus existential
In chapters seven and eight of the brief treaty, De Interpretatione (hereinafter 
Int.),8 Aristotle shows the forms that can be taken by simple propositions made 
up of a predicate-term (always universal; that is, “referable to many individuals,” 
as defi ned by him at the beginning of chapter seven) and a subject-term, which 
may be either singular or universal. When the latter applies, the universal subject 
may also “be taken universally,” which will give rise to propositions with a 
quantifi cation such as “every X...” It may also be taken non-universally,9 which 
will be expressed by a quantifi cation such as “some X...” What is important is 
the author’s insistence on differentiating the implicit universality — which inheres 
certain terms (basically the traditionally called “common names,” as well as 
adjectives) — from the universality made explicit in propositions by means of the 
determiners every and none. Moreover, the author considers these determiners to 
be exclusively applicable to the subject-term, since he thinks it inappropriate to 
have a proposition such as “Every H is every B,” exemplifi ed by the obviously false 
“Every man is every animal.”10 This clear differentiation between, on one hand, 
potential or implicit semantic universality and, on the other, an explicit syntactic 
mark of universal application does not really fi t the theory (which has become 
5 For instance, the presumed implication of I by A or the incompatibility between A and E.
6 With the help, moreover, of four axioms constituted by the Aristotelian syllogistic modes Barbara and Datisi, 
and by two identity principles (never mentioned, directly or indirectly, by Aristotle) expressed in the propositions 
XaX and XiX, where a and i are, of course, the homonymous functors of the Aristotelian system.
7 One of the merits attributed by Łukasiewicz (1951-1957, p. 6) to the Aristotelian Syllogistic is that it is entirely 
exempt from any contamination from philosophical elements allegedly strange to its purely formal nature.
8 Our quotations are based upon the standard Oxford translation, edited by J. Barnes, (Aristotle, 1984).
9 In Analytics, of a subject taken non-universally, it is said that it is “partially” taken. Hence its traditional 
designation as “particular.”
10 As Aristotle states it, “there cannot be an affi rmation in which a universal is predicated universally of the 
subject” (De interpretatione, 17b14-15). His starting point seems to be that the predicate always has a broader 
extension than the subject does. It does not hold, however, when the predicate is the defi nition of the subject, 
for then both are coextensive. So, for instance, he would have had no reason to dismiss expressions such as 
“Every triangle is every portion of a plane limited by three straight lines.” Nonetheless, the Organon’s author 
considers here the general case of predication, in which the predicate is a simple term and not a combination 
of terms as defi nitions are.
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predominant as from Łukasiewicz) according to which in Aristotle’s Logic there is 
no equivalent to the contemporary notion of quantifi cation.
But the main interest of the author of Int. seems to be to establish the 
relationship between the four possible types of “quantifi ed”11 propositions from 
the standpoint of their truth value (i.e. from the truth-functional standpoint typical 
of propositional Logic). To this end, he arranges the four proposition-types by pairs 
of negations in the following order:
A: Every human being (is) white. /vs/O: Not every human being (is) white.
I: Some human being is white. /vs/ E: No human being (is) white.12
The criteria applied to establish this scheme are the above-mentioned (i.e. 
taking, or not, subject-term in its whole extension — “universal taken universally” 
versus “universal taken non-universally” — and the affi rmative or negative statement 
of the predicate’s belonging to the subject). These four features, mutually opposed 
in pairs, allow establishing different types of opposition (antikeísthai) between the 
statements containing them.
The fact is that in Aristotelian Logic the opposition relationships amount to 
the truth functions of propositional Logic. As the purpose of the above alignment is 
to show the opposition between different simple statements made up of the same 
terms, Aristotle takes into account nothing resembling the truth functions later 
known (by the Stoics) as conjunction and disjunction.13 But he does really consider 
in Int., explicitly and in extenso, the truth function of negation (apóphasis) and, with 
less detail in Prior Analytics (hereinafter Pr.An.), that of implication (akoloúthesis). Now, 
due to the different quantifi cation of these propositions, the negation can be either 
total or partial.14 Total negation occurs between the affi rmative universal and the 
negative universal and is called contrariness (enantiótes); we will represent it as A├┤E. 
Partial negation occurs between universals and opposite sign particulars (affi rmative 
versus negative) and is called contradiction (antíphasis); we will represent it as A┼O, 
E┼I. The fact, which is at fi rst sight surprising, that Aristotle holds contrariness 
opposition (instead of contradiction) as being total can only be explained, as we 
shall see, if we admit as logically sound all the truth functions ascribed by Aristotle to
 the aforementioned relationships. Łukasiewicz’s axiomatic interpretation, for example, 
which asserts its fi delity to the Aristotelian text, has not been able to tell about this 
point. Implication is, in its turn, the relationship between universals and particulars 
of the same sign (both affi rmative and negative); we represent it as A→I, E→O.
In order to illustrate these three relationships, we can put them in the form 
of the following truth-functional tables.
11 For comfort, and even before deciding on the legitimacy of its application to Aristotle’s Logic, we will 
provisionally use this term when referring to those propositions introduced by every, none, & c.
12 In De interpretatione, Aristotle arranges these statements as A, O, E, I. Nonetheless, an allusion to “diagonally 
(diametrically) opposed” statements at 19b35, plus an explicit arrangement such as ours (which appears at 
18a4-6), clea rly shows that the propositions are introduced clockwise. Moreover, it is noticed that the author 
had in mind (and, surely, in a print accompanying the written text or the oral exposition, cf. 19b26-29) a scheme 
such as the one we propose here: The universal affi rmative placed at the left upper angle, its negation (the 
particular negative) at the right upper angle, the universal negative at the right lower angle and its negation 
(the particular affi rmative) at the left lower angle. No doubt this scheme was the origin of the tetragon of the 
Aristotelian tradition, although here, at least as from Ammonius’ comment (In de interpr. 75v) onwards, the 
universals A-E and the particulars I-O are placed from left to right and from top to bottom. In our English version 
we parenthesize the terms (as is the case here with is, is not) whenever they do not explicitly appear in Greek.
13 For this reason, a propositional Logic sensu stricto cannot be ascribed to Aristotle as it is ascribed to the Stoics.
14 The notion of “total negation” is actually expressed as “total falsity,” for instance at 54a2-18. Now, it is 
obvious that every false statement can be considered as the negation of a true one.
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Contradiction
A/E15 O/I A┼O/E┼I
V F V
F V V
F F F
V V F
Contrariness
A E A├┤E16
V F V
F V V
F F V
V V F
Implication
A/E I/O A→I/E→O
V V V
F F V
F V V
V F F
We could also add the relationship called, since Ammonius, subcontrariness 
(hypenantiótes). It was left unnamed by Aristotle and, unlike contrariness, allows for 
the simultaneous truth and excludes the simultaneous falsity of the propositions 
so correlated (the particular ones). Such a feature prompts us to call it compatibility 
relationship; we will symbolise it as I—O, its truth-functional table reading as follows:
Subcontrariness
I O I—O
V F V
F V V
V V V
F F F
15 When two letters separated by a slash mark appear in the two fi rst columns corresponding to the propositions 
that are terms of the opposition, it must be understood that the relation goes between the propositions on the 
same side of the slash in each column and never in a cross-direction — thus, in this case, between A-O and E-I.
16 As it can be seen, contraries totally deny each other in the sense that a statement negates about the totality of the 
semantic fi eld of the subject what its opposite affi rms about that very same totality. They are (to say it like Aristotle 
does) “diametrically opposed.” Their mutual “distance” is, therefore, maximal. That is why they admit an “intermediate” 
truth between the extremes they represent, although they can be both false. Given these characteristics, it would not 
be nonsensical to designate their mutual relation as one of incompatibility, in opposition to the mutual compatibility of 
particulars. The contradictories, in contrast, deny or affi rm, respectively, just a part of what is denied or affi rmed by their 
opposite. They are, so to say, “minimally” opposed. But also because each one’s semantic fi eld begins where that of the 
other ends, they do not admit an intermediate (principle of tertio excluso). Having this in mind, it is easily understood 
why Aristotle, in his refutation proofs of the syllogistic non-concluding modes (i.e. those that admit several different 
conclusions), limits himself to show that in every one of them the very same formal structure of the premises can lead 
to contrary (i.e. totally opposed) conclusions. This includes, a fortiori, every other possible (intermediate) conclusion.
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All these relationships are obviously symmetrical except for A→I, E→O. It is 
equally obvious (as pointed out by Russell, Kneale and Kneale, Quine, etc.) that if we 
interpret the propositions A, E, I, O in the way that is usual within the Logic of fi rst 
order predicates — with a clear-cut opposition between universal (or hypothetical) 
quantifi cation, on the one hand, and particular (or existential) quantifi cation, on the 
other — we can only hold in its integrity the truth-functional table of contradiction. 
For we would then have:
(1) For A (Every human being is white).  ∀x(Hx→Bx)
(2) For E (No human being is white).  ∀x(Hx→∼Bx)
(3) For I (Some human being is white).  ∃x(Hx·Bx)
(4) For O (Some human being is not white). ∃x(Hx·~Bx)
But if, according to De Morgan’s laws, we write:
(1 bis) For A (Every human being is white).  ~∃x(Hx·~Bx)
(2 bis) For E (No human being is white).  ~∃x(Hx·Bx)
it turns out, by virtue of the properties of conjunction, that both A and E could be 
true if only ~∃x(Hx) were true:
That is to say, were there no human being, both A and E would be 
simultaneously true, against the emphatic Aristotelian assertion that they can 
only be simultaneously false. Moreover, it is also clear that ∃x(Hx·Bx) cannot at any 
rate follow from ~∃x(Hx·~Bx); similarly, from ~∃x(Hx·Bx) no one could possibly 
conclude ∃x(Hx·~Bx) (as it should be the case in virtue of the laws of implication). 
Indeed, as previously shown, both universal propositions could be true in the case 
that ~∃x(Hx), which precludes any possibility of inferring from them, respectively, 
∃x(Hx·Bx) or ∃x(Hx·~Bx), as both expressions convey necessarily the truth of ∃x(Hx). 
Were that the case, we would have (except for contradiction) truth-functional tables 
completely different from those shown above:
A E A├┤E
V F V
F V V
F F V
V V V
A/E I/O A→I/E→O
V V V
F F V
F V V
V F V
I O I—O
V F V
F V V
F F V
V V V
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It is obvious that every difference between the three relationships is abolished, 
for all of them have exactly the same truth-values. Furthermore, these values are 
reduced to one (V) for every value of the correlated propositions, so these “functions” 
lose any usefulness to propositional calculus.
Such a result is even more disappointing insofar as the above proposed 
formulæ, ∃x(Hx·Bx) (I) and ~∃x(Hx·Bx) (E), reveal the sound base of the so-called 
conversion laws profusely used by Aristotle in his Syllogistic as a tool to “improve” 
the modes of the second and third fi gures by transforming them into modes of 
the fi rst fi gure. These laws state that both the universal negative and the particular 
affi rmative propositions can be inverted by exchanging (converting, according to the 
traditional terminology) the positions of the subject-term and the predicate-term 
with the truth-value of the proposition remaining the same.
The only possibility to get rid of this obstacle seems to be — as suggested 
by different authors, Strawson (1971) among them, but only to refute the solution 
or to show its artifi ciality — to bind the variable, at least for the subject-term,17 
with an existential quantifi er, even in universal propositions, so as to have the 
following result: 
(5) For A (Every human being is white.)  ~∃x(Hx·~Bx)·∃x(Hx)
(6) For E (No human being is white.)  ~∃x(Hx·Bx)·∃x(Hx)
This step allows us to rescue the Aristotelian concept of the relationships 
of contrariness, A├┤E, and implication, A→I, E→O, but at the unaffordable cost 
of ruining the most crucial relationship of contradiction, A┼O, E┼I, which is the 
basis of the whole logical building of Organon, as well as the convertibility of E, the 
cornerstone of Syllogistic.
Indeed, if A is interpreted as in (5), its negation (i.e., its contradiction) does 
not become simply O interpreted as in (4), namely ∃x(Hx·~Bx), but is interpreted 
instead as the disjunction:
(7) ∃x(Hx·~Bx)v~∃x(Hx)
These formulæ preserve the truth functions of contradiction (negation), but 
alter the initial interpretative scheme.
Much more serious is the fate of the other pair of contradictory propositions: 
If E is interpreted as in (6), its contradiction (I) will cease to be just (3), i.e. ∃x(Hx·Bx), 
but will become the semantically aberrant and abhorrent disjunction:
(8) ∃x(Hx·Bx)v~∃x(Hx)
(Who would be ready to accept that the proposition “there is some white 
human” could possibly mean that “there is no human being at all?”)
And, as a matter of fact, if for both statements we maintain (3) and (4), 
respectively, the relationship each one of them has with the contrary universal ceases 
to be contradictory and becomes one of contrariety (sensu aristotelico).
If ∃x(Hx) is false, then both (A), ~∃x(Hx·~Bx)·∃x(Hx), and (O), ∃x(Hx·~Bx), 
will be so. But, still, their simultaneous truth is impossible given the obvious 
incompatibility of ~∃x(Hx·~Bx) with ∃x(Hx·~Bx). This works analogously for (E), 
~∃x(Hx·Bx)·∃x(Hx), and (I), ∃x(Hx·Bx).
17 Kneale and Kneale (1962, p. 60f) consider that a reference should be presupposed, too, for the predicate 
to the end of saving both E’s convertibility and Syllogistic in general.
69
Filosofi a Unisinos, 11(1):62-84, jan/abr 2010
To be (something) or not to be: Existence and predication in Aristotle’s logic and metaphysics
In closing, the formula of (E), ~∃x(Hx·Bx)·∃x(Hx), by no means follows from its 
converse ~∃x(Bx·Hx)·∃x(Bx), as Aristotle would require. This is so because although 
the fi rst member of this formula, ~∃x(Bx·Hx), is equivalent to the correspondent of 
the fi rst (on the grounds of the conjunction commutative property), this equivalence 
never occurs between the second members, ∃x(Hx) and ∃x(Bx).
If we take this path in our trip through Aristotelian Logic, the baggage of the 
Russellian Logic of predicates is of no use. Nor is (as some authors propose) that 
of the Logic of classes with exclusion of the null class, as can be seen on the basis 
of an elementary analogy.
Now it is plain why Jan Łukasiewicz refused to use both formalisms and denied, 
by the same token, the existence of genuine quantifi ers in Aristotelian Logic. Though, 
it is not easy to understand why he did not fi nd an alternative interpretation other 
than the contrived appeal to propositional calculus.
There certainly are other ways out of the impasse.
Alternative solutions
One alternative solution was proposed by Granger (1970), according to whom 
Aristotelian Syllogistic is a set of metalinguistic18 rules of semantic consequence or inference 
in which only the terms and the propositions they form are found in the object language 
domain. In addition, within this set of rules the syllogistic modes and fi gures, as well as 
the procedures through which they transform into each other — especially conversion 
and exposition (ékthesis) — are but meta-reasonings that lie in the determination of 
correspondences between terms and propositions, on the one hand, and certain semantic 
models, on the other.19 The elements of propositional calculus that assuredly appear there 
belong to the metalogical level and not, as Łukasiewicz holds, to the object language level. 
The formulation technique of this metalinguistic analysis, used by Granger to symbolize 
the terms and their relationships of mutual, total or partial inclusion or exclusion, is that 
of the so-called “Euler’s circles,”20 always regarded as non-void term representations.
Sainati (vid. Menne and Öffenberger, 1995, p. 121) holds an analogous position: 
“Qua syllogistic deduction rules, Aristotelian formulæ are not laws possessing a ‘formal’ 
truth of their own and independent of the terms’ value. [...] Logic presents itself to Aristotle 
not as a formal science but as the metatheory of a certain non-formal object language.”21
Kneale and Kneale (1962) solution22 states that all the terms used by Aristotle 
in his formulæ are non-void, reference-endowed terms. It allows a reformulation 
of the propositions studied by him through the ordinary formalisms of predicate 
Logic — i.e. with the above formulæ (1 bis), (2 bis), (3) and (4) — but introduces 
therewith such a strong restriction to the interpretation of those formalisms that 
in practice it amounts to the suppression of every truly universal quantifi cation.
18 That is in sharp contrast with Łukasiewicz’s interpretation, as well as with the majority of the previous and 
subsequent attempts to see in Syllogistic a self-contained logical calculus in which both functors and variables 
would be at the same level of the discourse.
19 Vid. our Introduction to the Spanish edition of Prior Analytics (Aristóteles, 1988, p. 88): “By means of the 
syllogism, Aristotle attempts to create a conviction mechanism that, beyond the Semantics of concrete terms 
(although both the linking rules and the rules of transformation of some links into others are, at the end, semantic 
rules), by virtue of its own structure, of its fi gure, makes evident the concatenation between the extremes.”
20 As far as we know, Leibniz was the fi rst author who made use of this technique of schematisation of logical 
relationships. Euler’s circles should not be confused with Venn’s diagrams, which are much more precise but 
diffi cult to adapt to the Aristotelian proposition representation due to its’ supposed lack of void terms.
21 Translated from the German version). To Sainati, the terms are the only elements belonging to the object 
language — even the propositional functors (A, E, I, O) are metalinguistic in nature. We share this opinion.
22 See note 17 supra.
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Finally, Corcoran’s (1974b, p. 92f) proposal is probably the one that has best 
reconciled the requirements of modern formal analysis with Aristotelian Logic (i.e. with a 
respectful interpretation of Aristotle’s Logic). It presents Syllogistic as the exposition of the 
logic underlying the demonstrative method peculiar to science (as conceived by Aristotle), 
this logic being a natural deduction system in which fi rst fi gure syllogisms are “applications 
of rules of inference” and those of other fi gures are “derived arguments.” This deduction 
theory “is fundamental in the sense that it presupposes no other logic, not even propositional 
logic.” In addition, it is “complete in the sense that every valid P-c23 argument composed of 
categorical sentences can be ‘demonstrated’ to be valid by means of a formal deduction 
in the system.” Aristotelian natural deduction theory comprises, according to Corcoran, a 
language L consisting of the four logical constants A, E, I, O (renamed by the author as 
A, N, S, $ after the English determinants all, none, some, some not) and an infi nite set U 
of non-logical constants (the terms with no determinate content, symbolized by letters, 
which Aristotle uses). To language L corresponds a syntactic system S formed by signifi cant 
terms (with determinate content) “correlated with the secondary substances24 (sortal — or 
class — universals) [...]. The interpretation ix of the content word x is the extension of the 
secondary substance correlated with x.” This interpretation “assigns to each content word 
a set of primary substances (individuals) which ‘could be’ the extension of a secondary 
substance” (Corcoran, 1974b, p. 98-104). As the above mentioned authors do, Corcoran 
presupposes an existential import for every term of the Aristotelian logical language: “j is 
an interpretation of L if and only if j is a function which assigns a non-empty set to each 
member of U.” Corcoran adds: “This would explain the so-called existential import of A 
and N sentences. Notice that, according to this view, existential import is a result of the 
Semantics of the terms and has no connection whatever with the meaning of ‘All’.” (p. 104)25
Now, putting differences aside,26 all these authors recognize the rigorousness 
and completeness of Aristotelian Logic, not feeling the need of propping it up on 
other supposedly underlying formalisms such as propositional calculus. But, above 
all, they make evident that Aristotelian formalization is not merely calculus-oriented 
but also semantic; it only intends to show the regularities underlying natural language 
in order to facilitate its use as a rigorous argumentation tool at the service of scientifi c 
inquiry. This inquiry requires, in its turn, that any explicative proposition be directly or 
indirectly based (through argumentation) upon indemonstrable previous principles 
that are the object of “fi rst philosophy.” Hence Aristotle’s Logic, its formal strictness 
not being lessened, is inseparable from his Metaphysics.
For the same reason, since metaphysics is the knowledge of, or merely the 
inquiry about, the simplest elements of our representation of reality, it is unacceptable 
to circumscribe the Aristotelian logical analysis, as the aforementioned authors do, 
to the “higher” logical level which is that of syllogistic theory, or rules of proposition 
combination with deductive aims, without recognizing t hat this analysis presupposes 
the previous analytical level of simple statement. Therefore, it seems inexcusable to us, 
even if those authors’ conclusions are globally accepted, to take a further step attempting 
a coherent formal interpretation of the Aristotelian theory of intrapropositional links 
between terms. In other words, not to accept those links as unanalyzable27 “logical 
constants,” but to decompose them, if possible, into simpler elements.
23 “Premise-conclusion.”
24 In Aristotelian sense, cf. Categories 5.
25 The remark coincides with the Kneales’ interpretation mentioned above.
26 Granger, for instance, would disagree with Corcoran in the appeal the latter makes to the notion of “set of 
individuals” as a semantic correlate of the terms; instead, he talks about “classes of models or representations,” 
thus avoiding the merely extensional approach and getting closer, in our view, to the original Aristotelian stance.
27 This is the “abstentionist” approach adopted fi rst by Łukasiewicz and followed by (as far as we know) every 
subsequent scholar.
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Is Syllogistic a combinatorial device dealing 
with propositions or rather with terms?
As a matter of fact, a rigorous interpretation of the Aristotelian theory of 
deductive reasoning, or syllogism, leads us to lay stress on the links between terms 
rather than between propositions. Indeed, this emphasis occurs in the syllogism’s 
defi nition/description given by Aristotle in the fi rst paragraphs of Prior Analytics:
A reasoning28 is a statement29 in which, certain things being stated, something other than 
what is stated follows of necessity from their being so. By from their being so I mean that 
it follows because of them, and by what follows because of them I mean that no further 
term is required from without in order to make the conclusion necessary (24b19-22).
And later on, when introducing the commonly named fi rst fi gure:
Whenever three terms are so related to one another that the last is in the middle as 
a whole, and the middle is either in or not in the fi rst as a whole, there must be a 
perfect reasoning between the extremes (25b31-35).
Furthermore, in many passages of the same work, instead of talking about 
propositions or premises (protáseis), istotle does so about intervals (diastémata), 
obviously between terms.30
Now if syllogistic “calculus”31 is basically an “operation” carried out with 
several (at least three) terms, it becomes clear that the analysis must focus on 
the nature of the operators (Corcoran’s “logical constants”). As we have seen, 
such analysis is the core object of De Interpretatione, whose defi nitions of those 
“operators” summarily reappear at 24a18-19:
By universal I mean what holds of all or none; by particular, what holds or not of 
some or not of all.
That one term should be in another as in a whole is the same as for the other to be 
predicated of all of the fi rst. We say that it is predicated of all of another, whenever 
nothing can be found of which the other term cannot be asserted; to be predicated 
of none must be understood in the same way (24b27-35).32
It seems clear, then, that the aforesaid operators are four possible relationships 
of attribution of a predicate to a subject. The term ‘relationship’ is neither arbitrary 
nor anachronic; the author of Prior Analytics himself uses the corresponding verbal 
form échein prós (cf. 25b32). Given the characterisation that Aristotle makes of 
28 Within the Aristotelian text, we translate syllogismós by “reasoning,” for the Organon’s author uses that term 
in a much wider sense than the one strictly corresponding to the deductive schemes studied here.
29 In a broad sense (discourse) and not as a simple proposition (so it is understood by Łukasiewicz, who is 
conditioned by his prejudice of denying inferential character to the syllogism).
30 Cf., for instance, 35a12, 31; 38a4; 42b29. The same occurs in Posterior Analytics.
31 In fact, the term syllogismós refers to a certain notion of “computation” of several factors in order to obtain a result.
32 Aristotle shows here, as the expression of a universal predication, the equivalence between the formula that 
presents the subject, extensionally speaking, as a sub-set of the predicate set and the formula that presents 
the predicate as applied to the whole subject. He also notes an equivalence that should make refl ect all those 
who deny the existence of quantifi cation in Aristotelian Logic — to predicate something about every part 
of a subject is the same as to deny the possibility of not applying the predicate to some part of it. In short, 
something like the equivalence between the formulæ (1) and (1 bis) above.
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those relationships, we could symbolize33 them in the following way, which is much 
more descriptive than the four traditional vowels (P designates the predicate and 
S designates the subject):
Universal affi rmative:   P[S
Particular negative (negation of P[S): P]S34
Particular affi rmative:   P+S
Universal negative (negation of P+S): P–S
The properties of these relationships obviously are:
[  is transitive and asymmetric35
]   is neither transitive nor symmetrical
+,–  are symmetric but not transitive36
Together with the presentation of the terms in the standard (predicate-
subject)37 order proposed by Patzig, this symbolism allows to show quite clearly 
the deductive strength of the fi rst fi gure syllogistic modes where the conclusive 
relationship between the extreme terms naturally appears as the product of each 
of their relationships with the middle term. Actually, in determining this product 
negative and particular relationships prevail over affi rmative and universal, as is 
attested by the famous mnemonic hexameter of traditional Logic peiorem sequitur 
semper conclusio partem:
[ [ = [  – [ = –  [ + = + – + = ]  [ ] = ]
The combinations made up of two negative or two particular (namely: – –, 
– ], + +, + ], ] ]) give a null product, as they do not grant any common semantic 
fi eld shared by all three terms.
Applied to the four (perfect) modes of the fi rst fi gure, and representing the 
relationships as naturally as possible (namely, linking the extremes with the middle 
term in a continuous string), this would give:
Barbara:   A[B[C=A[C
Celarent:   A–B[C=A–C
Darii:   A[B+C=A+C
Ferio:   A–B+C=A]C
33 As is well known, Aristotle does not symbolize them (he only symbolizes terms). This reinforces the idea that 
the linguistic level of the operators is a metalinguistic one in respect of that of the terms. Terms are mentioned, 
operators are used.
34 This symbolization of the particular negative relation has the virtue of intuitively indicating its nature, opposed 
to that of the universal affi rmative; it suggests, at once, one of the three possible semantic interpretations of 
this predicative relation, according to which the predicate’s extension is included in the subject’s extension 
(the other way round of its opposite).
35 In theory, it would be possible to attribute the refl exive property to it, as Łukasiewicz does with this relation 
and with the particular affi rmative, reformulating them as identity relationships. But such property lacks interest 
to Aristotle, at least in Syllogistic, and so (unlike the Polish logician, who needs it to complete the picture of 
his axiomatic interpretation of Prior Analytics) he never makes appeal to it.
36 This symmetry would allow, without appealing to the ékthesis procedure used by Aristotle in Pr. An. I 2, 
an explanation of the convertibility of A–B and A+B. Very different, as will be shown below, is the case of 
“partial convertibility” of A[B into B+A, which at fi rst sight does not follow from the properties of the relation.
37 This is the order generally followed by Aristotle. E.g.: “If A is predicated of every B, and B of every C, A must 
be predicated of every C. [...] Similarly, if A is predicated of no B, and B of every C, it is necessary that A will 
belong to no C” (Pr. An., 25b37-a2).
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The modes of the other two fi gures were seen as imperfect by Aristotle due 
to their “lack of steps” to demonstrate in a direct way the relationship between the 
extreme terms. So they had to be converted, through a few transposition moves, 
into a mode of the fi rst fi gure, or proved by reduction ad impossibile.
So far we have not said, on the whole, anything that goes beyond what the 
above mentioned authors maintain. But we must part company with them if instead 
of considering the four operators, logical relationships, or constants, as external to, 
or superimposed upon, the terms, and the terms themselves as semantically indifferent 
to the relationships the operators impose on them, we suppose that the form of 
the relationship somehow modifi es the content of the terms.
But why should we suppose so? We feel obliged to do it for the following 
reasons:
The fi rst reason has to do with the fact that, in contrast with what we pointed 
out at note 35 supra, the justifi cation of the fundamental rules of total convertibility 
of the propositional schemes A–B and A+B, and that of partial convertibility of the 
A[B scheme (in B+A), has a semantic character, as is well shown by Granger (1970, p. 
299f). And it does so because it derives from a contraposition principle (the semantic 
version of the modus tollens which excludes a void interpretation of the terms) based 
upon the so-called ékthesis. Aristotle explains:
Now if A belongs to no B, B will belong to no A: for if it does belong to some B, say, to 
C, it will not be true that A belongs to no B: for C is one of the Bs (Pr. An., 25a14-16).38
This appeal to the ékthesis or exposition was implicitly criticised by Alexander of 
Aphrodisias (in Pr. An.,  32.32) as a move from the logical to the observational sphere 
and held by Łukasiewicz to be totally accessory and marginal (although valid from the 
logical standpoint if an existential quantifi er is added to the proposition that has the 
“exposed” term as its subject). Ékthesis actually is, according to Aristotle, the cornerstone 
of the convertibility rules: fi rstly, the convertibility of A–B into B–A and vice versa (and, by 
the same token, that of A[B into B+A); secondly, on the basis of what we have just said, 
the convertibility of A+B into B+A (which leads, together with the convertibility of A[B 
into B+A, to the implication A[B ÷ A+B). Now, without these conversion rules and, to a 
lesser extent, without the aforementioned contraposition principle, the syllogistic modes 
of the fi rst fi gure would be the only endowed with demonstrative power. Thereupon, little 
doubt can there be about the importance of the ékthesis procedure in Aristotle’s Syllogistic.
The application of an existential quantifi cation to the proposition resulting 
from ékthesis (as Łukasiewicz rightly proposes, although he does not admit that 
this formulation underlies Aristotle’s own view of the matter) lets us wonder why 
it would not also be possible to apply the existential quantifi cation to A+B type
propositions.
The second reason refers to the dubious soundness of a supposition shared by 
all modern interpreters of Aristotelian Logic; namely, that Aristotle does not consider 
the possibility of void, referenceless terms. Were this assertion true, we would then 
have to inquire the meaning of passages such as the following:
[...] Socrates is well is contrary to Socrates is sick, yet not even with these is it neces-
sary always for one to be true and the other false: for if Socrates exists one will be 
true and one false, but if he does not both will be false; indeed, neither Socrates is sick 
nor Socrates is well will be true if Socrates himself does not exist at all. [...] But with 
38 We emphasize the words exactly corresponding to the argumentation through ékthesis.
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an affi rmation and negation one will always be false and the other true whether he 
exists or not; for if Socrates exists it is clear that either Socrates is sick or Socrates is 
well will be true or false, and equally if he does not: for if he does not exist he is sick 
is false but he is not sick true (Cat., 13b14-34).39
Our interpretation of this passage, based on the translation of Ackrill (1963,
p. 37), as a proof of Aristotle’s admission of empty terms (Socrates, in the occurrence) 
could only be refuted on the previous denegation of existential import to the verb 
eînai here and throughout the Aristotelian corpus. In this respect, we refer to Hintikka 
(1986), according to whose authoritative criterion the passage just quoted, among 
many others,40 calls for an unequivocally existential interpretation of eînai.
Some could object that the restriction of the Semantics of terms to the point of 
excluding their emptiness is valid only for Syllogistic. However, it is well known that Syllogistic 
stands on the analysis of simple propositions that is carried out in Int., which in turn is one of 
Aristotle’s texts containing more allusions to referenceless terms. Besides that, Aristotle never 
warns us, neither in Pr. An. nor in Posterior Analytics (hereinafter Po. An.), about his widening or 
limiting the semantic scope of the terms he uses. In contrast, it is clear that in Po. An., as Hintikka 
(1986, p. 89-92) points out, one of the main aims of scientifi c reasoning is to demonstrate 
the existence of a reference for certain terms (which obviously implies the possibility of their
 lacking it).
The third ground to go beyond an exclusively denotational Semantics in the 
interpretation of Aristotle’s Logic lies in his analysis of a procedure traditionally
called “obversion of equipollent propositions.” This procedure consists of the passage
from an affi rmative proposition with a nominal predicate of a certain sign (e.g.
“Every human being is not-white”) to a negative proposition with a nominal predi-
cate of the opposite sign (e.g. “No human being is white”).41 Let’s remark, by the way,
that in a typical modern notation such as the first order predicate Logic this
transformation would be irrelevant because one and the same formula corresponds
to bothexpressions, namely ∀x(Hx→~Bx). Instead, from an Aristotelian standpoint,
a transformation between logically and semantically heterogeneous structures has 
occurred. In other words, according to Aristotle, the above statements are not equipollent
 propositions.42 He says:
No man is just follows from Every man is not-just, while the opposite of this, Not everyman 
is not-just, follows from Some man is just, for there must be one (Int., 10, 20a20-23).43
39 Cp. Categories, 13b14-19, 27-33. Whoever could be tempted to object that this translation relies on a biased 
interpretation of the verb åqíáé should read without prejudice the Greek original of this passage from Categories: 
–íôïò ìcí ãNñ ÓùêñÜôïõò hóôáé ô’ ìcí Pëçècò ô’ äc øå™äïò, ìx –íôïò äc Pìöüôåñá øåõäy· ï¡ôå ãNñ ô’ 
íïóåsí ÓùêñÜôç ï¡ôå ô’ ›ãéáßíåéí Pëçècò ìx –íôïò –ëùò ôï™ ÓùêñÜôïõò. [...] dðr äÝ ãå ôyò êáôáöÜóåùò 
êár ôyò PðïöÜóåùò Påß, dÜí ôå ƒ dÜí ôå ìx ƒ, ô’ ìcí fôåñïí hóôáé øå™äïò ô’ äc fôåñïí PëçèÝò. The idea 
of esse simpliciter or existence — in this case, its negation — is sometimes strengthened by the unequivocal 
adverb” –ëùò (“defi nitely”, “absolutely”) applied to the verb to be.
40 E.g. De interpretatione 21a25-27; Po. An. II 1-2; Sophistical Refutations 167a4-6; as well as many passages 
in Physics VIII and Metaphysics XII.
41 After Aristotle, we call a “negative proposition” that in which the negation is directly connected to the verb 
or verbal phrase — ‘is,’ in the occurrence.
42 Except for those cases in which the subject-term is a singular term as in Socrates is not wise = Socrates is 
not-wise (cf. De interpretatione, 20a23-26).
43 Bocheński (1956-1962), on the contrary, translates (erroneously) this passage as follows: “[The proposition] 
No man is just is followed by Every man is not-just. The contradictory of Some man is just is Not every man 
is not-just; for someone must be [just]” (original in German). Now, needless to compare it with the Greek 
original, it becomes evident that the contradictory of Some man is just cannot be at any rate Not every man 
is not-just, but No man is just, which in no way is equipollent of the previous one. Besides that, according 
to the Greek text, the arrangement of Every man is not-just and No man is just is exactly the opposite of the 
arrangement proposed in Bocheński’s version.
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And much more explicitly:
Now, in establishing or refuting, it makes some difference whether we suppose not to be 
this and to be not-this to have identical or different meanings, e.g.: not to be white and to 
be not-white. For they do not mean the same thing, nor is to be not-white the negation 
of to be white, but rather not to be white. The reason for this is as follows: The relation of 
he can walk to he can not-walk is similar to the relation of it is white to it is not-white; so is 
that of he knows what is good to he knows what is not-good. [...] If then not able to walk 
means the same as able not to walk or as not to walk, these will belong at the same time 
to the same thing (for the same thing can both walk and not-walk, and knows what is 
good and what is not-good), but an affi rmation and a negation which are opposed to 
one another do not belong at the same time to the same thing. As then not to know 
what is good is not the same as to know what is not-good, so to be not-good is not the 
same as not to be good. [...] Nor is to be not-equal the same as not to be equal: for there 
is something underlying what is not-equal, and this is the unequal, but there is nothing 
underlying the other. That is why not everything is either equal or unequal, but everything 
is equal or is not equal. Further it is a not-white log and it is not a white log do not belong 
to something at the same time. For if it is a not-white log, it must be a log: but that which 
is not a white log need not be a log at all (Pr. An., 51b5-31).
It is clear, then, that we are dealing with pairs of propositions which differ in 
nature so that one member of the pair can be inferred from the other but not vice versa; 
otherwise, the case would be a double implication relationship, i.e. one of equivalence. 
Now the sense of the simple implication is, according to Aristotle, just one that goes from 
the affi rmative to the supposedly equipollent negative, but not the other way round.44 
Indeed, besides the fi rst of the texts just quoted, we have (at 19b26-35):
“Let us clear what we meant from the following diagram:
 <A>      <B>
A man is just   its negation being: A man is not just;
 <D>      <C>
A man is not not-just  (negation of) A man is not-just45
Certainly, ‘is’ and is not are here added to just and to not-just. This is how these are 
arranged, as is said in the Analytics [51b36-52a17]. They behave in a similar way if the 
affi rmation is about the name taken universally, e.g.:
 <A>      <B>
Every man is just    Not every man is just
 <D>      <C>
Not every man is not-just   Every man is not-just”
And above all:
The relation of these to one another is as follows. Let A stand for to be good, B stand for 
not to be good, let C stand for to be not-good and be placed under B, and let D stand for 
not to be not-good and be placed under A. Then either A or B will belong to everything, 
but they will never belong to the same thing. And B must belong to everything to which 
C belongs (for if it is true to say it is not-white, it is also true to say it is not white: for it is 
44 With the exception mentioned at note 42 supra.
45 As noted above (see note 12 supra) and will immediately be proved, Aristotle states the propositions of 
this and other diagrams (the well-known “opposition quadrilaterals”) in a clockwise order. That is why the 
proposition placed at the lower right angle precedes in the text the one placed on its left.
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impossible that a thing should simultaneously be white and be not-white, or be a not-
white log and be a white log; consequently, if the affi rmation does not belong, the denial 
must belong.); but C does not always belong to B (for what is not a log at all cannot 
be a not-white log either). In contrast, D belongs to everything to which A belongs (for 
either C or D belongs to everything: but since a thing cannot be simultaneously white and 
not-white, D must belong to everything to which A belongs); for of that which is white 
it is true to say that it is not not-white; but A is not true of every B (for of that which is 
not a log it is not true to say A, viz. that it is a white log; consequently D is true, but A is 
not true, i.e. that it is a white log). It is clear also that A and C cannot together belong to 
the same thing, and that B and D may belong to the same thing” (Pr. An., 51b36-a14).46
Hence we would have the following scheme:
  A      B
 To be good     Not to be good
  D      C
 Not to be not-good    To be not-good
In this scheme Aristotle explicitly asserts that, besides the obvious A┼B and 
D┼C (contradiction) relationships, A├┤C (contrariness) and B—D (subcontrariness) 
as well as C→B and A→D (implication) occur, but the converse of the last two do 
not. The very same relationships, arranged in the very same order, appear likewise 
here and in the classical opposition quadrilateral.
It is crystal clear, then, that affi rmative statements necessarily entail the 
corresponding negative ones, the latter having a nominal predicate which stands 
as contradictory of the predicates of the former. This entailment does not obtain 
the other way round. Aristotle gives the reason thereof:
For if it is true to say it is not–white, it is also true to say it is not white: [...] but [...] 
what is not a log at all cannot be a not–white log either. [...] of that which is white 
it is true to say that it is not not–white; but of that which is not a log it is not true to 
say A, viz. that it is a white log.
What could this mean but that in a negative statement it is possible to 
interpret the subject-term as an empty term? In such a case it is evident that from 
this proposition it is not possible to infer another one in which the same subject-
term be endowed with a content; i.e. from the non-existence of something it is 
impossible to infer anything entailing its existence.
A lot has been written on the extent to which the notion of existence was 
explicitly present in the ancient Greek verb eînai (in Pr. An., hypárchein) and its 
relatives. Probably nothing can be added to Hintikka’s (1986) and, above all, to 
Kahn’s (2003, 1986) conclusions. According to them, the existential import of the 
verb eînai is implicit in its copulative (or, in Russell’s words, predicative)47 use and, 
46 In contrast with the previously quoted passages, in which the letters assigned to the propositions were 
mere additions of our own, in this case it is Aristotle himself who appeals to the expedient. This is the fi rst 
known text in which a symbol is assigned not to a term but to a whole statement. We see, thus, that the Stoic 
development of the symbolic Logic of statements already had some basis in Aristotle.
47 Hintikka emphatically asserts that the verb eînai cannot be dissected into the well-known quadripartite 
semantic distribution proposed by Frege and Russell, by means of which those authors attempted to dispel the 
ambiguity between an is: (a) identity sign, (b) predicate of existence, (c) predicative copula, and (d) inclusion 
sign. Kahn holds that to all those meanings or uses (we would rather say “values,” for we do not fi nd it possible 
to separate meaning from use) a veridical value (is = it is true that) must be added. Kahn holds also that all 
of them are closely related to each other (as if all of them had a “common root”) in the ordinary use of eînai.
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therefore, it never constitutes a predicate in the strict sense as it started to be in the 
philosophical jargon from the famous Anselmian (or “ontological”) argument onwards. 
In Aristotle’s case, we could say that the existential value of eînai appears perfectly 
explicit when it stands as the only predicative element together with the subject (what 
in the Scholastic tradition was called esse ut secundum adiacens); but the “structure 
underlying” both that use and the standard copulative use (esse ut tertium adiacens) 
corresponds with striking parallelism to the modern logical formulæ in which the 
variable is bound through an “existential” quantifi er. Actually, the examples in the 
passage just quoted from Pr. An. clearly suggest a reformulation of (1) the statement 
“The log is white” in “There is something that is a log and is white.” Analogously, (2) 
“The log is not–white” can be rewritten as “There is something that is a log and is 
not white.” In contrast, (3) “The log is not white” could be thus rewritten according 
to Aristotle, “There is something that is a log and is not white, or there is something 
that is not a log at all and, therefore, is not a white log either.”48 It is obvious that in 
a language like ours nobody would understand the statement (3), as we reformulate 
it, in the sense of the second member of the disjunction. That is why we can only 
assume that for a Greek from Aristotle’s times statement (3), regardless of its formal 
structure of subject-copula-predicate, meant something similar to our expression (4) 
“There is not a white log.”49
On the above grounds it seems necessary to propose a new formulation of the 
elementary propositions, as interpreted by Aristotle, in terms of fi rst order predicate 
Logic. In this formulation, the referential scope of the terms varies according to 
the type of relationship established between subject and predicate. This allows us 
to solve all the diffi culties encountered when we fi rst approached the matter by 
means of modern quantifi cation theory.
If ‘is’ (hóôé) connotes existence, ‘is not’ (ïšê hóôé) 
connotes non-existence
Actually, the formulation we propose here goes as far as to bring to its last 
conclusions the criteria constantly followed by Aristotle in order to determine the 
relationships between propositions that share identical signifi cant terms while 
differing as affi rmation and negation; namely, to determine for each proposition 
what its contradictory, i.e. its bare negation, is.
If, then, as it seems compulsory to do in order to account for the existential 
import of the copula, we begin by modifying ∀x(Hx→Bx) (the universal affi rmative) 
through the adjunction of an existential quantifi cation of the variable, we obtain:
48 That is to say (although Aristotle obviously does not state it in such terms) the proposition has a disjunctive 
semantic structure. The subject has a referent and the predicate does not apply to it, or it simply lacks any 
reference and applying the predicate to it is nonsensical.
49 In this regard, Kahn (1986) quotes an illuminating proposal, by then still unpublished, by Mohan Matthen. 
This author holds that in constructions with eînai you have a “predicative complex,” defi ned as “an entity 
formed from a universal and a particular when that particular instantiates the universal.” Kahn comments: “In 
grammatical terms, a predicative complex (or rather, its linguistic expression) is the attributive transform of 
an ordinary copula sentence: corresponding to X is Y we may assume the existence of a logically equivalent 
predicative complex, the YX exists. Thus, for (1) Socrates is healthy we have the corresponding (2) The healthy 
Socrates exists, where the truth conditions of (1) and (2) are assumed to be identical. Furthermore, truth 
conditions will also be the same for the veridical transform of (1), namely (1A) It is the case that Socrates is 
healthy.” According to Kahn, this interpretation would easily show “why our conventional dichotomy between 
existence and copula imposes a choice upon the interpreter that corresponds to nothing in the Greek data 
(Kahn, 1986, p. 27, n. 46).
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(9) ∀x(Hx→Bx)·∃x(Hx), or its equivalent (5) ~∃x(Hx·~Bx)·∃x(Hx)
It is obvious that denying that formula to obtain its contradictory opposite 
(the particular negative) will result in the already known formula:
(7) ∃x(Hx·~Bx)v~∃x(Hx)
Similarly, if we start from the particular affi rmative such as stated above, (3) 
∃x(Hx·Bx), its negation or contradictory opposite (the universal negative) will be 
expressed in the formula (2 bis) ~∃x(Hx·Bx), and not with the extremely inconvenient 
(6) ~∃x(Hx·Bx)·∃x(Hx).50
Now, by virtue of De Morgan’s second law, (2 bis) is equivalent to:
(10) ∀x(~Hxv~Bx)
The truth condition of (10) obviously lies on the interpretation of at least 
one of the terms, or of their intersection, as empty. Similarly, formula (7) proves 
itself true whether both do not overlap, if the predicate does not cover the whole 
extension of the subject, or when the subject-term is void.
Now it is trivial to see that being:
A: ~∃x(Hx·~Bx)·∃x(Hx)  O: ∃x(Hx·~Bx)v~∃x(Hx)
I:  ∃x(Hx·Bx)    E: ~∃x(Hx·Bx)
the Aristotelian truth-functional tables, as shown at the beginning of this paper, hold 
perfectly. Therefore, our interpretation perfectly accounts for all the properties assigned 
by Aristotle to the relationships between quantifi ed propositions. These relationships 
obviously are truth functions, despite that (i) the Organon does not develop a Logic 
of propositions stricto sensu and (ii) the proof of their validity compels to transcend 
the consideration of the propositions as atomic units and to decompose them into 
their elements, both categorematic (the terms)51 and syncategorematic (propositional 
functors, quantifi ers, and negations). But we realize, above all, that the assumption 
that grounds such an interpretation (assumption which is fi rmly supported by texts 
of Categories, Int., and Pr. An.) considerably “modernizes” the archaic denotative 
Semantics that has been so stubbornly attributed to the founding father of Logic 
by almost every modern Aristotelian scholar. It does so by ascribing to Aristotle the 
acknowledgement of “null classes”52 or referenceless terms.
Nonetheless, it must be kept in mind that our modern formal transcription 
of the Aristotelian formalisms has several restrictions that prevent us from talking 
about a “transformation without rest” of the Aristotelian language into that of 
mathematical Logic or vice versa. One of the most impressive evidences thereof is the 
already analyzed “asymmetric obversion” that forbids, in transcribing propositions 
that involve a negation, writing ~Ax in order to represent both x is not A and x 
50 This is the key element in our interpretation: the non-adjunction of the existential quantifi cation $x(Hx) to the 
standard formula of E. Among others, the passages quoted at the end of the previous section allow us to do 
so. It is evident there the admission by Aristotle of void terms in propositions with negative verb (“verb” being 
the copula or assertive functor, as distinguished from the predicate itself, that can be a name, an adjective, or 
a not merely functional verb with semantic content of its own.
51 The fact that Syllogistic is a calculus operating with terms rather than with propositions upholds the strategy 
of transcending mere propositional Logic.
52 The only exception here would be that Aristotle does not seem to consider the possibility of taking the null 
class as a sub-class of every other class.
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is not-A. (Paradoxically, this formal “anomaly” puts us on the track leading to the 
admission in Aristotle of a Semantics strikingly close to that of modern logical 
languages.) But the most important restriction is no doubt the one that compels to 
interpret A, as a matter of fact, as the conjunction of A and I. Such an interpretation 
deprives the universal quantifi er of its genuine universal nature because universal 
quantifi cation points not only to what is actually predicated of the variable but also 
to what is possible to predicate of it, and must, therefore, have a hypothetical, not 
a categorical, semantic interpretation.
Anyway, once we have reached this point, we should weigh the implications 
of our interpretation for the Aristotelian ontology, as every semantic theory entails 
an ontological theory, i.e. a theory of the links between the structure of language 
and the structure of reality.
“Being is not the essence of anything”53
Every affi rmative proposition (not only those containing a copula verb like to 
be plus a nominal predicate, but also propositions with predicative verb) somehow 
connotes the existence of what is denoted by the subject-term (and, by the same 
token, of what is denoted by the predicate). Although the opposite could seem to 
be the case, the reason for this is that in ancient Greek there is no verb unequivocally 
referring to our notion of existence. The verbs åqíáé and šðÜñ÷åéí appear as the most 
apt to play this role of existence predicates; yet in the Organon they operate as mere 
connectors of terms, lacking a semantic content of their own. As Aristotle explicitly says:
For not even to be or not to be is a sign of the actual thing (nor if you say simply that 
which is); for by itself it is nothing, but it additionally signifi es some combination, which 
cannot be thought of without the components (Int. 16b21-25) (Ackrill, 1963, p. 45).
Eînai with a “zero” nominal predicate (secundum adiacens) clearly seems to 
have a meaning that can be translated in expressions such as “exists” or “there is.” 
Nevertheless, Aristotle carefully warns “it is not a sign of the actual thing,” not even 
when used in its participial substantivized form which is the Greek idiom canonical 
for referring to what is real. In return, what is typical of eînai is that it “additionally 
signifi es some combination [ðñïóóçìáßíåé óýíèåóßí ôéíá].”
Now, as Aristotle puts it at 16b6-7, “a verb is what additionally signifi es 
time [...] and it is a sign of things said of something else” (Ackrill, 1963, p. 44). 
These are, then, the essential features of every verb, including “to be”: The verb 
establishes a link (sýnthesín tina) through which the meaning of a term (predicate) 
is included in the meaning of another term (subject), within the limits imposed by 
the reference to a certain instant or period within the temporal fl ux. Leaving this 
crucial feature aside, “a verb is a name and signifi es something [...], but it does not 
yet signify whether it is [the case] or not” (Int. 16b19-21; Ackrill, 1963, p. 45). So 
it is not the verb as an independent term, but the temporally determined predicative 
synthesis that bestows on the statement the extralinguistic reference that we call 
“existential import.”
The meaning of eînai comes closer than any other verb to the notion of 
existence (to the point of not merely connoting but openly denoting it when in 
position of secundum adiacens) because it is the most “meaningless” verb, a verb with 
minimal semantic content of its own (hence its overwhelmingly dominant use in the 
53 ô’ äEåqíáé ïšê ïšóßá ïšäåíß (Po. An., 92b13-14).
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position of the copula par excellence, a mere connector between signifi cant terms).54 
In other words, the outstanding capability of eînai to express the existence (or, in 
the negative form, the non-existence) of something follows from its being a purely 
grammatical element with no meaning of its own but, at the same time, crucial for 
making statements endowed with truth-value.55 But if existence is expressed by a 
term that does not signify but only additionally signifi es, we must conclude that, in 
Aristotle’s Greek, existence is not a meaning proper but only an additional meaning. 
Therefore, regardless of its being justifi ed or not in general terms, the Kantian dictum 
“existence is not a predicate” is fully justifi ed concerning Aristotle.
This conclusion is strengthened by the arguments offered by Kahn (1986) in order 
to demonstrate that the existential use of eînai derives from, and is connected with, its 
veridical use (which, unlike the existential use, was recognized as such by Aristotle in 
Metaphysics Δ 7).56 This veridical use is closely associated with the predicative or copulative 
use. The following passage is especially eloquent in this regard:
An affi rmation [êáôÜöáóéò] is a statement asserting something as united with some-
thing [ôéí’ò êáôN ôéíüò], and a negation [Pðüöáóéò] is a statement asserting something 
as separated from something [ôéí’ò Pð’ ôéíüò]. Now it is possible to state of what does 
hold that it does not hold, of what does not hold that it does hold, of what does hold 
that it does hold, and of what does not hold that it does not hold. Similarly for times 
outside the present. So it must be possible to deny whatever anyone has affi rmed, 
and to affi rm whatever anyone has denied (Int. 17a25-32).57
In statements including both a verbal predicate or a copula working as a 
tertium adiacens, the existence of what the proposition terms designate is additionally 
signifi ed by the affi rmative copula (represented by the verb eînai or by the morphemes 
of time, person, number and aspect of categorematic verbs) and its (absolute or 
relative) non-existence is likewise additionally signifi ed by the negative copula. But, 
what is the case when the verb eînai is used as a secundum adiacens, i.e. when it is 
apparently used as a predicate of its own?
Following a suggestion made by Owen (1960, 1965), Dancy (1986) holds that 
a proposition such as Homer is is but a simplifi ed version of Homer is a human being; 
in other words, it is but the ellipsis of a predicative proposition in which the (absent) 
predicate expresses the essence of what is referred to by the subject.
The trouble with this interpretation is that it frontally collides with a distinction 
clearly established by Aristotle in Po. An. (II 1-2) between the inquiry whether something is 
(åk hóôé: its existence) and the investigation of what is it (ôß dóôé: its essence). This is why we 
concede much more credibility to another interpretation that brings the structure of the 
aforementioned statements near the existentially quantifi ed schemes of contemporary 
Logic; thus, in the above example, Homer is = something is Homer = ∃x(x=Homer). Homer, 
so construed, ceases to be (logically) a subject and becomes a predicate. The same holds 
for the negation Homer is not = nothing is Homer = ~∃x(x=Homer).
54 As Peter Abelard wittily notes in his Logica ingredientibus, the copula “copulat tantum et non copulatur” 
(ed. Geyer 351) — it combines subject and predicate without “mingling” with them.
55 Aristotle calls them apophantic (assertive or declarative, in our grammatical terminology). He characterizes 
them as “those in which there is truth or falsity” (Int. 17a2-3) or, more precisely, “The simple statement 
[Pðüöáíóéò] is a signifi cant spoken sound about whether something does or does not hold [›ðÜñ÷åé] in one 
of the divisions of time)” (Int. 17a22-23).
56 See note 47 supra.
57 The idea of “union,” associated with the affi rmative assertion, is strengthened by its contrast with the idea 
of “separation” (conveyed by the preposition Pð’) associated with the negation. In order to emphasize that 
feature, our reading of the fi rst two sentences quoted departs signifi cantly from Ackrill’s version.
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This device is the same as above in the treatment of the standard copula-
predicative statements, e.g. a man is white = something is a man and is white = 
∃x(Hx·Bx), and every man is white = something is a man and everything that is a man 
is white = ∃x(Hx)·∀x(Hx→Bx), & c.
This prompts us to establish a thorough connection between Aristotle’s 
(implicit) notion of existence and his notion of subject (šðïêåßìåíïí) — whatever 
has a substrate does exist. To exist is to subsist.
Now, according to Aristotle, matter (œëç) is the absolute subject, that 
which can never become a predicate of anything. But as a pure subject matter 
cannot be described, or assigned any semantic content. It is only by virtue of 
the predicative function of the copula that it can leave the darkness of pure 
indeterminacy and go beyond its anonymous condition, acquiring a certain 
“identity” in the discourse.
Here we have another (not formal but strictly metaphysical) reason for 
considering the quantifi ed formulæ of predicate Logic as the best symbolic58 
approach to the Logic of Organon. In fact, the so called “individual” variables, 
inasmuch as they represent the “pure” subject of the proposition, almost exactly 
correspond to Aristotelian matter (this concept being the theoretical result of a 
semantic-grammatical analysis of the propositions describing change processes, 
analysis carried out by Aristotle mainly in Physics, I 5-9).
The formula ∃x(x=Homer) itself (vid. supra) is a literal example of what the 
so-called “individuation principle” could be to Aristotle, the strict identifi cation of 
a minimal subject (matter) with its maximal predicate (form).59 As a matter of fact, 
in contrast with the normal attribution relationship in which the subject is partially 
determined by the predicate (determination which is partial even in the case of 
essential predication there is such an x that x is a man, for instance), what we have 
here is an exhaustive determination in which what is really attributed is the implicit 
intersection of all the possible predicates of the subject (predicates whose series, 
in each particular context, must be held to be fi nite if the term summarizing them 
has to be non-ambiguous).
In fact, therefore, to state the existence of an individual is a particular case 
of use of the verb “to be” as an identity sign, in a double sense. In the sense, 
fi rst, of asserting the identity of an indeterminate “material” element with a set 
of determinations condensed in a singular term (which can be a proper name or 
a defi nite description) and in the sense, also, of “identifying” such indeterminate 
material element by means of its determination.
The “deep structure” of the “pure” existential propositions can be obscured 
when the apparent (grammatical) subject is a proper name (e.g. ÓùêñÜôçò dóôßí).60 
But it makes itself evident in cases such as hóôé ôéò Tíèñùðïò, in which the real, 
ultimate (and logical) subject, the indefi nite matter, is indicated through the 
indefi nite pronoun ôéò. For that reason, “pure” existential propositions evenly admit 
translations like “a man exists” or “something is a man.” That very same formula, 
substantivized without a verb (¿ ôrò Tíèñùðïò), is used by Aristotle in exemplifying 
58 Always keeping in mind, however, that the modern formalisms constitute just an approximation, never a 
literal translation, in respect of Aristotelian logical-semantic system.
59 The reduction, proposed by Aquinas, of the individuation principle to the materia signata quantitate (what 
amounts to consider the quantity as the only predicate determining individuality), represents an inadmissible 
degradation of the discernibility criteria (stated later on in the Leibnizian identity of indiscernibles principle). It 
lowers them to the “clonal” level of mere spatial criteria (those which allow to distinguish, for example, one 
scrap from another in a piece of cloth).
60 This happens to Frege, who does not admit the unfolding of singular terms into formulæ containing an 
existential quantifi er.
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the ðñþôç ïšóßá, the primary entity, which he defi nes as pure subject. While a whole 
defi nite series of essential attributes as well as an indefi nite series of accidental 
attributes (maximal comprehension)61 can be predicated of it, the primary entity 
cannot be predicated of anything (minimal extension). Indeed, the ðñþôç ïšóßá 
cannot be predicated of anything, in spite of its being expressed by one or more 
predicates, for such predicate/s has/have contracted its/their extension and widened 
its/their comprehension up to the point of its/their exact coincidence with the subject 
(matter) it/they inform/s, so constituting a perfectly univocal and unique complex 
of semantic features.
The shift we propose, from a predicative notion of existence62 to a subject-
like notion of it, means to think of existence as an implicit substrate, as a feature 
that “is assumed” to be rooted in the subject of every proposition whenever it 
be not explicitly denied.63 It calls for the necessary identifi cation of existence and 
matter. Were we right, this would easily explain Aristotle’s belief in the eternity of 
the universe and, a fortiori, of matter (for how could existence cease to exist?),64 
as well as his being apparently “tempted” in Metaphysics Z 3 to identify œëç and 
ïšóßá, temptation he can only resist by bestowing absolute ontological primacy to 
the ðñþôç ïšóßá, construed as a whole (óýíïëïí) of matter and form.
To Aristotle, then, tò òn (being) as such, represented by the copula which gives 
predicative form (contingent or necessary) to the formless substrate of mere fact 
(existence), has no reality outside those very predicative structures (forms) it asserts 
but which are always, in their turn, either partial, transient, or both.65
What we call being, verbalized in Greek as the apophantic operator or copula 
hóôé (and derivatively as the participle ––í), works apophantically66 as light does. It 
makes visible,67 through the essential transparency of the predicate, the existential 
opacity of the subject and it exposes what is supposed without posing it either as 
subject or as predicate, transcending by itself the opposition between essence and 
existence.
Unlike the Parmenidean, Aquinian, or Heideggerian being, closed upon itself 
and pregnant of essential attributes or phenomenological-existential pathos, the 
Aristotelian being (mere link without content of its own) has in itself no entity. 
This feature enables it to identify itself with every concrete entity, to take on the 
perfection of every form as well as the precarious condition of any accidental 
61 See, among other passages: Categories 2a13, 16, 22-25 & c.
62 Invention of a certain medieval philosophy, developed thereafter by mainstream modern philosophy, which 
was forced eo ipso to bring the object of metaphysics from the domain of real being into the realm of what 
is merely possible.
63 In which case it simply happens that the pure material subject, the mere something, is deprived of the predicate 
that was embodied in it, as we saw at 51b28-32 & c., while the material subject itself remains “untouched.”
64 The “totalitarianism” of the Aristotelian conception of matter becomes apparent in the reduction of what 
is possible to what is materially possible (i.e. to the potentialities lying in the matter). Aristotle does not think 
at all, as modern philosophy (since Leibniz) does, of a plurality of possible worlds out of which the real world 
would be just a particular case. On the contrary, the only thing that deserves to be qualifi ed as possible, 
for him, is what can come-to-be out of the matter underlying everything existing in the physical universe. 
Symmetrically, what always is (in a certain way) is, according to Aristotle, necessary. We can infer from there 
that Aristotle professes a particular form of the “principle of plenitude”: Given the double framework of an 
infi nite time and a fi nite space, everything that can come-to-be sooner or later will come-to-be. Similarly, 
what is not necessary or what can cease to be, some time, sooner or later, will cease to be. On the contrary, 
what never ceases to be, what always is, is necessary. These considerations, stated at the end of De Cælo I, 
refl ect a restrictive conception of the Semantics of modal statements, analogous to the existential restriction 
of the affi rmative categorical propositions. A detailed study on the subject can be read in Waterlow (1982).
65 The motionless Prime Motor and the heavenly spheres are certainly eternal, but they do not exhaust the 
reality of the universe.
66 Pðüöáíóéò means, etymologically, “manifestation of a (previously hidden) thing.”
67 Hence its veridical function, from PëÞèåéá — truth as a disclosure.
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attribute, rooting both forms and accidents in the solid existential substrate of the 
subject. In short, by being nothing, Aristotelian being can be everything; although 
it can only be expressed inasmuch as it is “determined” by means of the different 
types of predicates (categories). By itself, without categorially “reducing” itself, it 
does not determine anything. It is neither genus nor essence of anything.68 In return, 
the essence (ïšóßá) is the being of everything: ô’ ôß ƒí åqíáé.
To exist, therefore, is not only to subsist as pure subject but also to be 
determined by means of a predicate. To exist is to acquire a certain essence and 
certain attributes. Hence, Dancy and Owen’s equivocal interpretation of existential 
statements as ellipses of essence statements. Hence, also, the confl ation in the Greek 
word ïšóßá of two different semantic contents: the subject-like one (substance) and 
the predicamental one (essence).
On the basis of the Aristotelian concept of tò òn, it becomes clear why the 
famous ontological argument about God’s existence was radically fl awed; for 
existence does not determine any subject, existence is itself the subject of every 
determination.
Now we can get a better understanding of the nature of negative propositions 
according to Aristotle. Rather than saying that those propositions cut off the 
connection between subject and predicate, cancelling at the same time the reference 
of either one or both terms, we must say that they cut out the possibility that the 
existence-subsistence of an absolutely undefi ned subject be determined through 
the predicate and be recognized as really existent.
Let us conclude, then, by stressing how the Aristotelian ón, in oscillating 
between the absolute existential indeterminacy of matter and the perfect categorical 
definability of essence, has thereby a flexibility that in exchange for all the 
equivocations it can entail for a strictly logical analysis of its role in the discourse 
protects it from many of the sophisms conveyed by certain formally more elaborated 
ontologies, whose very sophistication makes it easier for them to confuse their own 
conceptual constructions with reality.
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